Abstmct: Techniques are presented that allow A to convince B that she knows a solution to the Discrete Log Problem-i.e. that she knows an x such that d = B (mod N ) holds-without revealing anything about x to B. Protocols are given both for N prime and for N composite. We prove these protocols secure under a formal model which is of interest in its own right. We also show how A can convince B that two elements a and B generate the same subgroup in Zk, without revealing how to express either as a power of the other.
Bob accepts an exponentially small chance that Alice is cheating, i.e. that she pretends to know an x but doesn't. More precisely, the chance that Alice succeeds in cheating without being detected by Bob, will be 2 -T , where T is proportional to the time and space required.
In this paper we present a number of protocols which solves this problem, both for the case N a prime, and for the case N = P1P2, where P I and P2 are prime and of roughly the same size. Notice that there is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm known for finding x given a, fi and N . But even when Alice is restricted to polynomial computational power (as we will assume), this protocol is of interest, since given a and N she can choose x E [ 1,N -11 with gcd(x, H N ) ) = 1 at random and then compute / 3 simply by exponentiation.
In this paper we define the notion (almost) no information whch is very similar to "zero knowledge", introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR85] (and which has nothing to do with Shannon-information). The difference is that in the GMR model the prover has unlimited computational power, whereas in our model her power is only polynomial with coin flipping.
In section 7 we illustrate the need for such a model by giving an example in which both parties have a symmetrical position, and where it is reasonable to assume that neither has unlimited computational power.
As far as we know, no other protocol with the same functionality has been presented. Very recent results by Goldrekh, Micali and Wigderson [GMW86] , Brassard and Crepeau [BrCr86] , and Chaum [Ch86] , however, all imply the following: if Alice has a certificate (or witness) of a particular statement which can be verified in polynomial time, then there exists a polynomial time protocol in which she can convince Bob that she has a certificate, without releasing any knowledge (or information in [Ch86] ) about the value of this certificate; consequently, there exists a polynomial time protocol for showing possession of the Discrete Log. Nevertheless, these protocols are not very practical. An important merit of the protocols presented here is their practical feasibility.
The structure of this paper is as follows: The next section describes the model and the notion of information under which we prove our protocols secure. In section 3 and 4 we present the protocols together with their proofs of security in the prime and composite cases, respectively. Section 5 is devoted to a specific variation which surprisingly turns out to be insecure. Section 6 gives a protocol to convince another party that two elements generate the same subgroup in 2;. The paper ends with an example and two open problems.
The model.
In this paper we wiU use the model developed in [BKP85], but with some modifications. Below we briefly sketch this model using a modified notation. It should be pointed out that this sketch assumes familiarity with [BKp85] or [GMR85] .
We think of a protocol as occurring between two Probabilistic Turing Machines (PTM's) A and B which operate synchronously. Each PTM has, besides a computation tape and a random tape, a one-way infinite tape for incoming messages. We call this tape the "mailbox" of the machine. The FTMs communicate by writing into each others mailbox. We call each of the machines in such a system a CPTM, for Communicating Probabilistic Turing Machine. Now consider a system of two CFTMs A and B. The system [A ;B] halts whenever A or B halts; the system accepts only when B halts and accepts. Throughout this paper A wiU interactively demonstrate possession of a secret to B, so (using the terminology of [GMRW]) we call A the prover and B the verifier. In [BKFM] this secret is the factorisation of a large composite number. But in general, the solution to an instance of any problem assumed not solvable in random polynomial time may serve as a secret. We define IA as the pair constisting of the problem instance and the secret; IA is usually created by A , and is considered the input for the system [A ;B]. Given I A , we define 1; as the single problem instance, thus wirhout the secret; we assume that A sends I; to B before the actual protocol starts. For example, in our Discrete Log protocols IA = (a, 8, N , x ) , and 1; = (a, B, N ) .
For simplicity, we explicitly force the time ordering in the messages by requiring that A and B alternately write one symbol in the other's mailbox. If a party has nothing to communicate it writes the special null symbol, V, not used for any other purpose in the communication. We also assume that both parties do not write superfluous null symbols, so the places where null symbols are written is a function of I;. We define f2 : = U (0, 1, v} n, and the contents of a mailbox as an element of Q. is defined as the probability that c €az occurs as the conversation between A and B resulting from the initialising instance IA , under the assumption that the bits on the random tapes of A and B are chosen independently and uniformly.
The following definitions (which are modifications of part (iii) of the definition of an Asimulator preceding theorem 1 in [BKP85]), will serve to make precise the kind of security achieved by our protocols. Informally speaking, they state that the prover A releases no information if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulating machine which, when initialid with Z i and for all possible verifiers B', produces simulated conversations between A and B that have (almost) the same probability distribution as the true conversations between A and B. This simulating machine, denoted S A * , is a PTM S that contains another machine A*. This A* is called as a subroutine and outputs a simulation of A's part of the conversation. Input for SA-is the problem instance without the secret, I ; ; the output is denoted as output(S~*(I;)). For describing a cryptogaphic protocol in the model presented, we will use the same protocol notation throughout the paper. The meaning of this notation is straightforward; only the next few things might need explanation: -Expressions shown on the left or right are known to that party only, and are secret from the other party. T is the security parameter, agreed upon before the protocol starts. Increasing T reduces A's chance of successfully cheating exponentially, but increases the amount of communication and computation only linearly.
e E, S means that an element e is chosen at random from the set S, where all elements of S have an equal probability of being chosen, independent of all previous events. In some steps of the protocol a party checks if a particular equality holds; this is denoted as: check a 4 b. If the check fails, cheating is detected and the protocol halts.
The proofs of security for our protocols are considerably simplified by the fact that there is ---essentially no two-way communication. The nature of the protocols presented here is such that the bits that B reads from his random tape, can also be generated by a mutually trusted random source. The correctness of the protocols lies in the randomness of the bits generated, however, there is no reason for B to bide these bits. If a protocol has this property, we say it is venfierpassive.
Several coin flipping protocols are widely known which allow A and B to generate mutually trusted random bits, see e.g. [B182]. Below we briefly describe the general nature of these protocols. Let b E {O, 1) be a bit, r be some random padding, and assume that A and B agree on a function F with the folloaing two properties: 1) given the function F and the value F(r,b), the bit b cannot be computed by B;
2)
given the function F and the value F(r,b), a pair (r', b') for which F(r,b) = F(r',b') and b # 6' cannot be found by A .
Then A and B can use the following protocol, called r, for generating mutually trusted random bits:
Protoool r coin flipping A B
Step 1:
Step 3:
Step 4:
Note that in this protocol the role of A and B can be interchanged, but t h i s might depend on the model of computation.
For generating bit strings of length T, this protocol can be extended to a protocol Tr in two Merent ways: a sequential version, where r is repeated T times, and a parallel version, where both parties send message tuples of length T. We will use this coin-flipping as a subprotocol.
Because of the time ordering in the conversation, the meaning of each cell in the mailboxes of A and B is completely determined by 11, the kind of protocol used, the security parameter T and the initidsing instance IA . So in the mailboxes we can &tin@ between sequences of cells dedicated to the coin-flipping protocol rT, and sequences of cells dedicated to the top-level protocol II. More formally, if2 = (b . . . , bT) are the bits generated through r T , we define A* has to guess in advance the bitsxresulting from Tr, otherwise the simulation fails. In the parallel version of Tr the probability of A' guessing correctly all bits is only 2-=. In the sequential version of l?T this probability is 44 in each round. But as soon SA* realizes that the wrong coin is being simulated, the machine is reset to the state it had when that round was entered and tries that round again. Because of this fact, the error probability can be made arbitrary small. Though SA*'S expected running time is increased by a factor 2T when compared to A , the Simulation still runs in probabilistic polynomial time.
Theorem 2 establishes the analogous result regarding protocols which transfer almost no information.
Theorem 2 . Suppose the protocol IT is verifier-passive, that a coin-fipping protocol Tr is used, and that an e, 0 Q e < 1, and a CPTM A* exists such that for all CPTMs B', where 1 : = 1 IA I. Then A releases almost no information through the protocol IT.
Proof:
The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1.
Machine A' in the statements of Theorems 1 and 2 is called a prover-simulator machine or just an A-simulator machine.
From now on we denote the bits produced by a coin flipping sub-protocol r by the word COIN FLIPPING, and a twwsided arrow. Furthermore, 2, is the additive group (mod N ); and Zk is the multiplicative group (mod N ) .
Protocols for proving possession of the discrete logarithm modulo a prime number.
The problem is the following : A knows a solution to the equation di G /3 (mod P ), where we assume that x is randomly chosen from [1,P -11. P,a,B are public and B wants to be convinced that A knows x. A wants to convince B, but does not want to release any information about x.
We will give two protocols for this problem. Our first example is an easier protocol; however, it works only if a and B both generate the same sub-group in Z> and A is willing to a&-nowledge this. If a and /3 do not generate the same sub-group, protocol 1 releases information about the index of (8) in (a). An intuitive way to think about this protocol is to consider the expression h, : = aer made public as lying somewhere between a and 8; upon getting the value of the bits, A shows either how to express h, as a power of a, or how to express # I as a power of hi.
Fhtocol 1: d = / 3 (mod P); P, a,B public; x with gcd(x,P -1) = 1 a secret of A ; a$ generate the same sub-group. 
A B

Proof:
(a) Correctness: If A does not know x, then she is not able to compute both possible exponents to be released in step 3. Hence she will get caught with probability at least Yz with each h,. Thus A will get caught cheating with probability at least 1 -2 -T .
(b) Senuity: We exhibit a simulator A* which, for random bits b l , . , . ,bT, produces random h l , . . . , h~~Z ; , a l o n g w i t h r , s u c h t h a t~~' -h , i f b , =Oands,suchthath: = B ( m o d P ) i f 6, = 1. We construct A* as follows:
A-Simulator for protocol 1:
2:
3: Ifb, = l t h e n s , E , Z~-l a n d h , : =~, w h e r e o , = s , ' ( m o d P -l ) .
4:
If b, = 0 then s, E~ 2; -and h, : = as' (mod P ).
Output h,, 6, and s, for I E (1, . . . , T } .
The reader can verify that the b,'s, hi's, rj's and si's produced by simulator A' have the same joint probability distribution as the corresponding numbers produced by A in an execution of protocol 1. Note that the computations in step 3 can be done in polynomial time using Euclid's algorithm. By Theorem 1, protocol 1 reveals no information.
Protocol 1 has the advantage that it can be performed sequentially by using T = 1 and repeating step 1 to step 3 many times. Protocol 2 below can be proved to be secure only when it is performed in parallel; however, it can also be used if u and f3 do not generate the same group.
Protocol 2: d = / 3 (mod P ); P, a,/3 public; x a secret of A .
Step I :
Step 2:
Step 4: Theorem 4 . 
ProoE
(a) Correctness: Suppose that A does not know x . Then she will get caught with probability at least H for each h,, for i # j. This is because A can never answer both possible cases to be sent in step 2. Now, independent of what j is, A's chance of being caught with h, is also at least ' h, because she cannot know ej and pass the check after step 4. So the only way A can pass all the checks in step 3 and step 4 is by guessing correctly what the vectorzwill be. This happens with probability 1 -2 -T .
(b) Securig: Note that protocol 2 is verifier-passive. We exhibit a simulator machine A' which produces messages and random bits which have the same joint probability distribution as messages from A and mutually trusted random bits in an execution of the protocol. By Theorem 1 it then follows that protocol 2 releases no information.
In the remainder of the proof we have For random bits b 1, . . . , br, A . must produce random h 1, . . . , hr in Z;, along with ek such that sl E el-e, (mod P -1) satdymg a ' ' must produce the difference struct machine A* as follows:
A-Simulator for protocol 2:
shy ' (mod P ). We con-1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
b l , . . . , b r E~ ( 0 , l ) . Let K and L be defined as before.
For k EK Choose Sk ER z p -1, a d k t hk := ask (mod P).
For / E L -0') let hl := a"'-'B.
Let hi := a-cp.
Output hi, biand si for i = 1, . . . , T, and <. 
a the ,$ produced by A' have the same joint probability distribution as the ones produced by A in an execution of protocol 2. o = aeJ. Now it follows immediately that the bi, the e,, the h k , the sl and
The crucial difference between A and A' is, that the simulator A* does not know the actual values of the el (because it does not know x), but only their differences (mod P -1 ). Since the protocol does not reveal the actual values of el and x, but only their difference with e, taken (mod P -1 ), the protocoi is secure. In this section we consider the analogues of protocols 1 and 2 modulo composite numbers, where we assume that the proving party A knows the factorization of N (henceforward called N A ) .
So the problem is the following: A knows a solution to the equation
where NA is a composite modulus whose factorisation is known to A only. Again a,B are public and B wants to be convinced that A knows x. And A wants to convince B, but does not want to release any information about either x or the factorization of N A . Note that the operations on the numbers themselves are carried out modulo NA , but on the exponents modulo $(NA).
First consider the analogue of protocol 1. As is easily v d e d , the protocol is feasible, but cannot be proven to be secure. The crucial point here is that when we look at the simulator for protocol 1, this simulator cannot execute step 3 since it does not know "A) (namely, this is essentially equivalent to knowing the factorisation of NA). The simulator must generate pairs (h,s) for which hS = /3 (mod NA ). But since we cannot prove that any simulator can do this in polynomial time (in fact this does not seem very likely), this modification of protocol 1 cannot be proven secure.
AS we will show now, protocol 2 can be used for composite numbers as well, be it at the cost of a very small probability of insecurity. This protocol is exactly the same as protocol 2 except that exponents are chosen modulo ~N A ) .
The sums and differences of exponents are also revealed modulo HNA).
Theorem 5 . (a) A can cheat in protocol 3 with probability 2-T if she does not know x, and (b) there exists a polynomial-time prover simulator A' that produces a conversation with almost the same probability distribution.
proof:
(a) Correctness: the same as for protocol 2.
(b) Security: The added complication is that A must not only know x, but, in order to perform the protocol, must also know the value of HNA). Hence the possibility arises that A may release some information about the factorization of NA . However, we can use the same simulator machine A' as in the proof of security for protocol 2, except that A' chooses exponents uniformly from the set { 1, ..., NA } . We can do this since the construction for A' involves no exponent arithmetic modulo HNA). Thus the value of H N A ) is not used by A'. The resulting probability distribution is not identical to the one generated by A , who choses her exponents in
However, a straightforward computation shows that the difference of these distributions, as expressed by the s u m of absolute differences in definition 2, is negledgibly small. Use here that NAis exponentially small in the size of N A (assuming that NA is the product of two prime numbers of nearly the same size). Thus protocol 3 releases almost no information. Let A denote the stochastic variable for the length of the interval, and let Pr(A=A) be the probability that A iS the length of the i n t e n d Then we define the average release of information as (1--X/N) cardinality of L.
age release of information for this protocol is approximately log2 I L I < log;! T, where I L 1 is the 6. A protocol for proving that two elements generate the same group in Z> or 2;. Let a EZ; or Z i , and let (a) denote the multiplicative subgroup generated by a. Protocol 1, 2 or 3 can all be used to show that (a) = (/3) provided that A knows a relation between a and 8. Note that proving that (a) = (8) is a problem not known to be solvable in polynomial time even modulo a prime number.
Protocol 5: (a) = </3) i n Zfi; a, /3 and N are public; x for which Lu' G fi (mod N ) is a secret of
A .
Use protocol 1,2 or 3 in both directions: A shows to E that she knows how to express /3 as a power of a and how to express a as a power of 8.
The correctness of this protocol is easy to understand: [BKPW], the proofs of security of protocols 1-3 show that these protocols are strongly secure and a (mod N ) . A knows x and g N ) , thusA
